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AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS & THE ETHICS
OF CONFLICT
Moderator: Ben Jones
Panelists: Micah Clark, Claire Finkelstein, and Oren Gross
Ben Jones:

Welcome everyone to the second panel today,
Autonomous Systems and the Ethics of
Conflict. My name is Ben Jones. I’m the
Assistant Director of the Rock Ethics Institute
here at Penn State. I’ve been tasked with
moderating today’s panel. We have a
distinguished group of panelists who I’ll
introduce: Micah Clark, here closest to me, is
the Senior Scientist for Autonomy, Artificial
Intelligence and Cognitive Science at the
Applied Research Laboratory here at Penn
State. Previously, he was a program officer at
the US Navy Office of Naval Research and he
holds a PhD in Cognitive Science from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
Next is Oren Gross, he’s the Irving Younger
Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School. He’s an internationally
recognized expert on international law and
national security law. In addition to his
academic work, he previously served as a
senior legal advisory officer in the international
law branch of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Judge
Advocate General’s Corps.
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And then furthest from me is Professor Claire
Finkelstein. She is the Algernon Biddle
Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Pennsylvania. She founded
and is the faculty director of the Center for
Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. She’s widely
published on the laws of war, issues of national
security and legal theory.
We’re going to be focused on the ethics of
using autonomous weapons systems within
conflict zones. This is an area where there’s not
a lot of consensus yet among ethicists,
engineers and others working on this issue.
When you look at the literature on this
particular topic, you’ll find some making a very
strong case that there should be an
international ban on autonomous weapons
systems, and that we need to be putting our
efforts into making sure that ban is put in place
before these systems are unleashed.
On the other hand, you have some that make
the case that there’s an ethical obligation to use
these systems, that when you look at the
history of conflict, you find atrocities, you find
war crimes, and that in fact if we would
transition to these systems, we would end up in
a much better place than we are now. So, the
goal today is to tackle some of these issues,
look at how these systems are being used,
whether or not they can be compatible with
international humanitarian law, and with our
conceptions of ethics. I’m going to keep my
remarks to a minimum because I want to give
time to our panelists. I also hope that we have
some time at the end for Q&A with the
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audience. So, with that, I will hand it over to
Micah.
Micah Clark:

Thank you, so I’m Micah Clark, and I want to
say that I’m here speaking as a technologist-I’m
not an ethicist, a lawyer or a policy maker, and
I’m speaking only for myself, not for anyone
else, certainly not anyone within the
government. The genesis for today’s discussion
and others like it has stemmed from the
concerns about the undesirable impermissible
and potentially unethical uses of technology.
Technology that is becoming ever more
accessible, not just to world militaries but to
non-state actors.
A lot of these discussions have played out in
the public under the rubric of killer robots, and
in terms of existential threats posed by artificial
super intelligences. To be clear, I am much less
concerned with the prospect of actual artificial
intelligence than with the manifest abundance
of artificial and natural ignorance. Let me also
be clear that even without US involvement,
kinetic and non-kinetic autonomous weapon
systems are coming, and some are already here
and no treaty will change that. The advantages
militarily or from a terroristic perspective are
simply too great.
So in the time remaining, I just want to pull on
a couple of threads. In particular, I want to
look at lethal autonomy just as a straw man in
some sense, and the desire for real
accountability to frame some of the challenges
that face policy makers and technologists. But
before jumping into that, let me try to
summarize what autonomous systems are from
the operator or user’s perspective. So the use
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of autonomy essentially consists of
constrained, context sensitive authorities that
the humans are temporarily seeding to the
system. So if we want to get more specific,
autonomous systems don’t have libertarian free
will, so you’re delegating to them and to the
system the authority to decide and act within a
given space of possible decisions and actions at
a certain level of granularity over a given time
window using predefined certain types and
sources of information, relative to certain
environmental situational conditions and
context, so as to satisfy some set of explicit
responsibilities. They are subject to you, the
user’s, expressed intent and the enforced
behavioral constraints within the system that
reflect policy and law.
Micah Clark:

I know that, that is a mouthful and probably an
ear full, but in the end the import is that what
you are doing is you are separating the
authority to decide and act from accountability
for those decisions and actions. That is the
point of autonomy; you are giving over to
systems the authority to decide and act on your
behalf, so that in some sense you don’t have to.
But there is a desire for accountability within
our systems. In fact, I would say that, and
much I think of international law is based on
this, that there is a presumptive compact
affirming the sanctity and intrinsic value of
human life. That the decision to intentionally
take human life in the use lethal force is of such
consequence that we as society, as a species,
desire to be able to hold decision makers
accountable for the choice. But, of course, you
can’t hold a toaster accountable, you can
unplug it, you can’t punish it.
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Regardless of how we label our technologies or
as Dave Atkinson mentioned how much we
anthropomorphize technologies, they are
artifacts, they are not moral agents, whether
under the law or under theology or under
philosophy of mind. We read those properties
into them, but they aren’t real. And this is
actually, I think the reasonable view taken in
both the DoD Directive on autonomy and
weapons systems and in the revised DoD laws
of war. We can talk about whether that is a
viable position 10 years from now later, but this
lack of accountability for artifacts motivates us
to reserve for humans the authority to choose
lethal actions to keep humans in the loop and
to ensure meaningful human control over
autonomous systems.
The problem is it is not clear that accountability
can be maintained. This is true for present
systems and certainly true for future system.
So, to briefly explain the problem: autonomous
systems are imperfect, they are limited in their
scope, their abilities, their understanding. Their
decisions and actions are dependent on
unforeseeable environmental and situational
conditions, that are in situ to where the system
is, not where you the operator are at, and
certainly not where you, the decision maker,
were when deciding to employ this system.
Their internal operations are often unintuitive
and exceedingly difficult for humans to
internalize accurately. That is okay because it is
not like we sufficiently train operators on any
of these things. Operators lack the tools and
the situational awareness necessary to
anticipate both system behavior and what the
consequences of that behavior will be in the
78
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situation as it unfolds. In fact, from the military
perspective, we lack the tools and even the
basic
methodology
to
assess
the
appropriateness, sufficiency, proficiency and
risks of using an autonomous system relative to
some given unfolding situation. We do it based
off of rough estimates and gut feel and what
the vendor says the system can do, but there
isn’t a methodology there that says these are
the trades, which is the kind of thing you would
want if you’re going to make well-reasoned,
well justified decisions on what kinds of
systems you’re going to employ in the moment.
Micah Clark:

So in the end there is this huge chasm between
what human operators believe and what is
actually true. Yet as these systems become
more capable, we will delegate more and
broader authorities to them. This will increase
not just the system’s independence, but the
causal distance between the decision to
delegate, and the consequences of that
decision, and certainly well beyond the causal
distance that any human operator could be
reasonably expected to foresee. In addition,
autonomous systems will be and are being
tasked with achieving objectives for multiple
simultaneous
missions,
for
multiple
simultaneous users. These systems are
expected to satisfy between them to choose
exactly which of the goals to pursue and how.
The net result of this is near impossibility of
actually tracing and determining responsibility
for action. So taken as a whole, it is not clear
that we could rightly hold any one person
accountable, that there would be someone with
the sufficient cognizance and fore knowledge
that we could point at and say you are ethically
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and legally responsible for what this system
did.
Micah Clark:

So far we have really been talking the context
of what might be described as monolithic
autonomous systems. If we were to expand out
to include swarms, psychological operations,
cyber, then the law of war principles of
distinction and proportionality become even
more problematic if not unsurmountable,
which I think is the case for much of cyber. So
what is the impact of this? Well, for policy,
there are limits to human accountability in the
use of autonomous systems, at least for what
you could rightly hold someone accountable
for.
As a technologist, I need policy to deal with
practical issues not just the abstract. So take for
example, an operator working with an
automatic threat detection and targeting
system. The kind of systems that exist, and are
widely fielded it around the world today. What
matters to me in designing how the human
machine team ought to work for that, and what
the role and responsibilities are for the
operator boils down to relatively simple
questions, but much closer to metal than
policy. What constitutes sufficient evidence of
a threat? What information is relevant to their
determination? And what of that is available to
the operator? How is the threat determined?
What are the relevant thresholds for
competence and certainty? What are the
uncertainties associated with targeting and
force application? What constitutes acceptable
risks within that trade space, if the operators
would make a decision? How much decision
time is going to be available to the operator and
80
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is that sufficient given the legal jeopardy that
they are in making it? How much time is there
between the operator’s decision to act and the
actual application of force? In that window of
time, a lot of unexpected, unpredictable events
can occur that will fundamentally change what
is appropriate.
Micah Clark:

What is the role of assistive technology? Is trust
and reliance, and say, a threat estimation
system, is that a valid justification for an
operator’s decision to act? If so, is the operator
required to know when such trust is
appropriate, and how would they know that? If
it is not sufficient justification, what additional
information do they need? And what decision
process is required? And are such things
available either today or in our future systems?
So these and many other questions like it are
essential to justifying an operator’s decision to
act or not.
Now, autonomous systems will and do play a
critical role in the use of force. Yes, apart from
reactive defensive systems, we can preserve the
use of force decision as the prerogative of the
human. But that is one small piece of it. If we
look at detection and targeting, threat risks,
course of action assessment, mission
prosecution and so forth, it is technology and
increasingly autonomy that is performing those
functions. Fire forget may work for
ammunition that has a total mission lifetime of
thirty seconds, five minutes, ten minutes, if
we’re talking about a system that is going to do
a loiter and interdiction over a three day, three
month, three year period, then the decision
made at one moment in time that yes, we’re
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going to use it. That person can’t be held
responsible for all that might follow.
Micah Clark:

So we need policymakers and technologists to
work together to ensure that the results, in
choreography of mission teams makes sense.
For human operators, they only have the
resources we give them, whether that is time,
information, assessments, predictions and so
forth. The question is what do they need if
there is to be real accountability? And is that
something we can give them? For autonomous
systems themselves, look, they need a codified
calculus for right decision making, whatever
that might be. Policies that are based on
reasonable persons and other such legal
fictions aren’t much help. Autonomous
systems are not reasonable persons. They are
compliant automatons that do exactly what
they were designed and told to do. They have
no common sense. They have no
understanding of the world. They are going to
do what they were designed and told to do,
even if it is completely wrong.
So switching to technology, despite what you
might expect, I actually don’t think the key
challenge for technology is ensuring ethically
correct behavior. That has certainly been
looked at. There are various proposals for how
that might be done either through verification
or ethical governors, there are approaches to
doing that. I think the hard challenge on the
technology side is characterizing the
proficiency and performance of these systems.
So as technologists we need to be up front
about what information is used and what is
ignored, how confidence and certainty are
treated, how decision options within the
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system are conceived, evaluated and selected.
What competence is assumed within the
planning process and what performance is
actually achieved.
We need to understand in reality the
performance envelope on these systems
relative to system’s belief and as well as our
beliefs and actuality in the world. Well, that
sounds straight forward, it is exceptionally
hard, especially for active learning
technologies. The performance envelopes are
highly nonlinear, they are always perverse
corner cases that no one has thought of, and
these failures of imagination are the historical
Achilles heel both in the intelligence
community and in the engineering world, and
will continue to be.
Micah Clark:

So I don’t think we will ever know the behavior
of our systems across the totality of the
problem space, that is acceptable versus
unacceptable performance relative to a variety
of acceptability criteria including ethical
behavior relative to either all possible situations
or a given under a specified situation that we’re
trying to evaluate. I don’t think we will ever
know that. I don’t think it is theoretically
possible to know that. But we might be able to
at least characterize the performance boundary
between known acceptable and simply
unknown. Does not mean the system is going
to do something crazy, does not mean it is
going to go wild and go off the reservation. We
just don’t know, we have not tested that, we
have not looked at that yet, but we know we
can accept its performance within these
operating conditions and everything outside of
that, simply unsure. If we know that, that is a
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key critical enabler for having appropriate
delegation trust and reliance in autonomous
systems.
Ultimately, however we parcel out
responsibility and authority between the
human team members and the systems, we
need that piece. We need to understand not
just what the systems will do, but that is how
they operate and how they behave
appropriately for the kind of situation we’re
sending them into. And with that I’ll yield the,
probably zero, time I have left.
Ben Jones:

Thank you Micah. Oren.

Oren Gross:

Thank you to the Center and for the Journal
for organizing, and to Penn State for hosting.
It has really has been a pleasure to listen to the
previous speakers. I like the framework that
Brian introduced in the first panel, i.e. that of
storytelling and thinking about the story. Of
course, there’s also the question of the timeline
or the time frame of the story. Are we thinking
about next year, next five years, next ten, fifty
or more? So when you are talking about AI, for
the non-technologists in the room, there is
always the question of what is the future that
you envision? Do you envision the
Terminator? Is the first image that just comes
up? Or is the first image that comes to mind
that of R2D2? And of course, even with
Terminator, which movie are you thinking
about? After all, the Terminator actually turned
good at some point.
So let me start off by putting forward my
completely non provocative, and I’m sure
generally accepted, claim: Humans out of the
loop is not necessarily a bad thing. Human
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input may not only be at some point
unnecessary but dangerous to our soldiers, our
civilians and to “their” civilians. In developing
that claim, I will note that the question of
accountability that we heard quite a lot about is
a critical question, but it is not the only question.
Let me develop the claim.
Oren Gross:

Throughout human history, technological
advancements have been a paramount factor in
creating, maintaining, shifting and destroying
military advantage and dominance. Despite
that the basic component of the military has
remained and will remain, at least for the
foreseeable future, human soldiers. At the
same time carbon-based human soldiers are
increasingly the major limiting factor for
operational dominance in conflict. Simply put,
human beings are becoming the weakest link in
armed forces. When you think about speed of
decision making, about big data, how much
information is coming in, about the pressures
of combat, about our physical capacities and
limitations, about our cognitive capacities and
about the cognitive burden of decision making,
and about emotions, both good and bad, you
realize that all of these somehow limit our
capacities in making good and timely decisions.
The relationship between humans and
weapons has been changing and shifting since
the appearance of humans on the face of the
earth. Yet, underlying all these changes is the
perception that human beings exercise direct,
albeit not necessarily full, control over
weapons. From the first time that a human
hurled a stone at an enemy, he (at least first
more likely than she) did not have full control
over the weapon. He had direct control, but
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not full control. Still we had human decisionmaking on issues of life and death.
Oren Gross:

That did change at some point in time to a sort
of partnership model of relationship between
human beings and weapons, some sort of
complementarity between us and our weapons
systems. There are things that computers do
better and there are things that humans do
better. Computers can do number crunching
or deal with big data better. Their speed of
response is much faster than ours. They may
have total recall capabilities (keeping with the
Schwarzenegger
theme).
They
have
disembodied intelligence and instant transfer
learning so that they can transfer data and
knowledge even if one system is destroyed.
Yet, there are things that humans do better
than machines (at least for now), such as our
capacity to engage in ethical decision-making,
to adapt to new circumstances, and to show
emotions and feelings such as empathy. In
addition, juxtaposed with the silicon-based
machine’s number crunching power, we are
endowed with evolutionary cleverness,
allowing us to be prune decision-making trees.
But now we speak of the next stage in our
relationship with weapons, a stage that some
have called de-humanized war, or what I would
rather call the post-human war represented by
a move to fully autonomous weapons systems
that would reduce or eliminate altogether
human control. General Allen refers to this as
‘hyperwar.’ I should note that the term
‘hyperwar’ has already been used to descrive
World War II. But what we talk about now
involves machine learning algorithms, artificial
intelligence powered autonomous decision
86
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making, advanced sensors, miniaturized high
powered computing capacities, high speed
networks, cyber capabilities, and things such as
autonomous swarms.
Oren Gross:

One major effect or result of all of these
capabilities and capacities is the minimization
of human involvement in decision making. So
we might increasingly see as, as General Allen
suggested, humans providing broad high level
inputs while machines do the planning,
executing and adapting to the reality of the
mission, and take on the burdens of thousands
of individual decisions with no additional
human input.
So is that a good thing or a bad thing? Well, it
depends on your perspective and attitude. We
already spoke about the “responsibility gap,”
i.e. the offloading of responsibility to what is,
in essence, not a moral agent. The offloading
of responsibility to what is not a moral agent.
Humans should bear the moral responsibility.
We want humans to make judgment calls such
as decisions about proportionality and be
ultimately responsible to life and death
decisions. And so we seem to need some sort
of human control over the machine.

Oren Gross:

Thus, we come to ask to what extent do
humans, could humans and should humans
maintain control over sophisticated weapons
systems? Many of you are familiar with the
Observe, Orient, Decide and Act or OODA
loop as was developed by the military strategist
John Boyd. In the context of human-machine
relationship there can be three options. First, a
human can be in the loop. Here we speak of
machines that are capable of targeting and
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striking solely as a result of a human directive.
Second, a human can be on the loop where the
relevant weapon system is capable of
independently targeting and delivering force
while under the supervision of a human who
retains an override capacity. Finally, a human
can also be completely out of the loop, i.e.,
when a weapon can target and deliver force
without any human input or interaction.
When we speak of meaningful human control,
we usually focus on level one or two, i.e.,
human in the loop or human on the loop. But
consider the following questions and
challenges. Meaningful human control over
what exactly? What is it that we need to
regulate? Part of the problem here is that we
are not entirely sure what the technology is
going to look like and as a result, we currently
have definitions of autonomy, and
autonomous weapon systems that vary greatly.
We do not have any widely accepted definition
of what an autonomous weapon system is. We
also do not have an accepted conception of the
exact stage in which meaningful human control
ought to be exercised. Is it the stage of
developing, programming, designing, or
training of the weapons systems? Is it at the
stage of developing machine-specific rules of
engagement, or the stage of the decision to
deploy autonomous weapons systems in
specific combat operations?
Oren Gross:

Nor are we even sure about what “meaningful”
human control actually requires in order to be
meaningful. We have some essential elements
that we thing should be evaluated when we are
talking about meaningful human control, such
as informed decisions, sufficient information,
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or effective control over the use of the
weapons system, but even those are quite
general and nonspecific.
But let us assume that we got over all of these
obstacles and are able to agree on what
“meaningful human control” means. There still
remain significant challenges to the very
concept of meaningful human control that cast
grave doubts as to its usefulness. Before I turn
to these challenges at the end of my
presentation allow me to remind you all that, as
I noted earlier, since the beginning of time,
humans have been employing weapons that
lack perfect real time situational awareness of
the target area. The essence of projectile
weapons is that we do not have full control
over their trajectory, nor can we suspend or
abort the attack after launching them.
We have been discussing the question of
responsibility and accountability. It is,
undoubtedly, a critical question but it is not the
only one. Another important issue is how to
minimize the harms of armed conflict to
civilians, civilian objects and even to soldiers.
What means and methods should we use in
order to minimize such harms? And to me the
question is if we have means and methods that
actually allow us to minimize harm, does it
matter whether those are human controlled or
whether those are eventually going to be
autonomous? If we believe that there are now
or that there would be means or methods of
warfare that protect humanity better than other
means or methods, and that those means and
methods are still within the lawful bounds of
the laws of armed conflict, then irrespective of
whether the means to that end are human or
89
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machine or some sort of a combination of
both, we need to clearly think about those.
Oren Gross:

To be sure there are going to be failures. We
are not going to get down to zero mistakes. But
the real question is what is the standard by
which we judge autonomous weapons
systems? Are we looking for systems that
would have an unrealistic zero risk of failure or
do we want systems that are at least as good as,
and most likely better than, humans in
upholding the laws of armed conflict? We
know that when we deploy soldiers, they are
going to make mistakes. If you want no
mistakes then do not deploy soldiers at all.
Meaningful human control is also a wishful
thinking to some extent. Consider what it
means to have a meaningful human control
over a driverless car. Ultimately, when such
cars are available to us, we will want to sleep or
read as the car is driving itself. What, then, is
our meaningful control over such vehicles?
There is also the question of time. With the
massive amount of incoming data and the
required, speed of decision making, it is unclear
how much control you actually can, or should,
have over autonomous weapons systems,
especially when under fire. In fact, I would
suggest that soldiers will not have the luxury to
slow things down.

Oren Gross:

There are other considerations that we need to
take into account that may prevent us from
meaningfully controlling those machines in the
long run. Consider, for example, the
automation bias, i.e., the fact that we put
greater degree of trust in computer-generated
information than in other sources of
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information. Then there is the phenomenon of
automation complacency. If I am on the
battlefield, and there is a lot of data coming in
and the computer tells me X, do I have the time
or capacity to second guess it? Do I have the
willingness to try to reconfigure and rethink
this? Or do I just take X as a given ignoring, for
the most part, the possibility of malfunctions
or machine errors. This is often coupled with
the challenge of machine explainability which
makes sophisticated systems practically
“immune” to human analysis.
And so, as my time is up, let me conclude by
suggesting that meaningful human control
may, in fact, be not only unnecessary but
actually dangerous to both soldiers and
civilians.
Claire Finkelstein:

Alright. So this will be, at first, a radical change
of topic. One of the most gripping books I
have ever read, is a book called The Mascot.
It’s the story of a little boy named Alex Kurzem
during the Second World War. Alex was a fiveyear-old Jewish boy who watched his family,
his mother and his siblings murdered in
Ukraine. He escaped and found himself in the
woods in Lafayette and was eventually
captured by a Latvian SS unit, lined up along
our church wall with other Jewish prisoners.
He was about to be shot by a firing squad at
that moment. For some reason, he reached out
and said, can I have a piece of bread? And
suddenly the commander told his squad to
lower their rifles. He took Alex into the church,
pulled down his pants, saw that he was
uncircumcised, raised his pants up again and
said, “Don’t ever let anyone do that to you
again.”
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Claire Finkelstein:

He took Alex and made him a miniature SS
uniform and adopted him into the unit. Alex
survived the war inside a Latvian SS unit, hence
the name the Mascot as he was their mascot.
So human moral reasoning. The most
challenging question raised about autonomous
systems is whether we should embrace the idea
of non-human actors engaged in selfdetermining action when lethality is at stake.
Do we want machines to have the ability to
make decisions with life and death
consequences without humans in the loop?
Whether self-driving cars, autonomous
weapons
systems,
medical
diagnostic
programs, and many other applications that are
in the works. We are not just playing chess
anymore and the stakes are extremely high.
Although academics and scientists in the
artificial intelligence communities have written
about machine intelligence for many years, the
question of whether computers can engage in
moral reasoning rises to prominence now in
this debate with particular urgency. The critical
nature of the current moment may be obscured
by the fact that we have had semi-autonomous
weapons around for a long time.

Claire Finkelstein:

The drones that were used heavily by the
Obama administration to fight Al Qaeda and
AQAP in northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere were not fully
autonomous weapons systems. According to
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, our
weapon systems are those that can select and
engage targets without further intervention
from a human operator. Unlike semiautonomous weapon systems which leave
target selection, the hands of humans and
reserve computer activated agency for
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implementation
of
preselected
aims.
Autonomous Weapons Systems require
computer systems to exercise judgment. They
must exercise perceptual judgments, spacial
awareness, judgment about context and
changing conditions. They must be able to
capture the best of what we all know as
common sense, which is especially hard to
capture, and as one roboticist at a conference I
held once quipped to me, especially by
roboticists who were rather lacking often in
common
sense
themselves.
Most
controversially, autonomous systems must be
able to exercise a certain special kind of
judgment, which is ethical judgment.
Now, I believe that roboticists, engineers and
computer scientists vastly underestimate the
difficulty of this latter task. Whether that is just
to help keep us philosophers and lawyers
employed, I do not know, might be my own
cognitive bias. But what they fail to realize, in
my view, is just how complex moral reasoning
actually is and how little we know about what
it involves. Note how much more difficult this
challenge is than other challenges AI has faced.
In other areas we have clear criteria for success.
If you’re trying to model human reasoning
around spatial awareness in the way that
human drivers do, we know if we have
succeeded, if the autonomous vehicles are
successful in getting passengers safely to their
destination. If we want to know whether a
medical diagnosis program successfully
models, physician reasoning, we need only look
at whether the intelligent diagnostic programs
get it right.
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Claire Finkelstein:

And by the way, my understanding is this has
been particularly unsuccessful though my
information here may be outdated. In short,
moral reasoning about life and death is
different when we’re examining the ethical side
than the more outcome based reasoning we’re
trying to capture when we’re trying to model
navigation, spatial awareness and diagnostic
programs. With moral reasoning we do not
know what counts as getting it right. What
most deeply characterizes moral reasoning is
not necessarily the outcome as much as the
process. So here I wished to highlight two
critical questions in this area when we talk
about modeling ethical reasoning. The first is
what exactly are human beings doing when
they engage in ethical reasoning? And the
second is whatever that is, whatever they’re
doing, is this something that we really want
autonomous systems to do? We tend to assume
that, but actually once we see the way humans
reason morally, to me it’s an open question:
whether or not that thing is exactly what we
want to be modeling.

Claire Finkelstein:

So let me turn first to the first question. There
is very little agreement in the philosophical and
psychological literature about the nature of
human moral decision making. Two basic
views on this question have persisted over the
ages. The first regards moral reasoning as the
specific application of general abstract moral
principles. These are highly abstract, moral
norms such as the second formulation of
constant categorical imperative that instructs
us never to use human beings as a means, but
only as ends in themselves. Moral reasoning on
this view consists in the application of general
abstract principles to particular situations. So
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let’s call that the top-down view of moral
reasoning.
Now, a second view sees moral reasoning as
the integration of highly fact specific elements
calling for an overall weighing of morally
salient features and analogical reasoning, based
on a comparison with similar situations with
similar features. A person reasoning in this way
might notice, for example, that there are four
morally relevant aspects of a situation, and we
call similar situations in which these same
elements were present here. She might then
implicitly assign weights to these different
elements, and consider how the result in this
case based on such assignments might
correspond to the results in other cases. On
this view, moral reasoning would be more
particularistic and context sensitive. It is also
on this view analogical neighborly based on
drawing analogies between the current
situation and other situations involving similar
features. So I’ll call this view of moral
reasoning bottom-up.
Claire Finkelstein:

It is relatively easy to imagine how a computer
might be able to reason morally if reasoning is
top-down. Computers excel at applying general
rules or principles to particular instances. One
model of this was provided by attempts to
build a machine that could make difficult
ethical decisions in medical cases. Ethicists
considered four principles essential to
decisions in this area: autonomy, justice,
beneficence and non-maleficence.
The ethical decisions ethicists had to make sure
all were involved. They thought of some
application of these four principles to the
95

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

Symposium Issue

particular medical situations that arose.
Traditionally, bioethicists have maintained that
all four principles must be satisfied if a course
of action is to be endorsed as ethical. There is
no weighting of these principles necessary.
They thought all constituted necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions. As long as it is
possible to teach a computer when these
principles are satisfied and when they are not
in any given situation. There is no reason to
suppose that this kind of reasoning could not
be modeled by an intelligence system, but is
this what ethical decision making is really like?
Consider a different example. A sentencing
jury has been paneled to consider whether a
convicted killer should receive the death
penalty in what we now refer to as a bifurcated
trial. The jury has not itself pronounced the
defendant guilty. It has functioned as to say
whether the state’s request that the defendant
receive the death penalty should be granted
under current constitutional doctrine. The
state’s death penalty statute sets out a list of
aggravating factors, and the jury must be
instructed to find that at least one aggravating
factor exists. Mitigating factors, however, are
treated differently. Current death penalty
jurisprudence insists that mitigating factors be
non-enumerated, meaning that the defense
may present anything to the jury that it believes
speaks in favor of mitigation. There was no
restriction on the type of evidence that may
count in this regard. Moreover, the only type
of death penalty statute that is currently
accepted under Supreme Court jurisprudence
is one that has a defined list of aggravating
factors and a completely undefined or open
treatment of mitigating factors. And somehow
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the jury is supposed to identify an item from
the list of aggravating factors, and then do what
with the mitigating factors in combination with
aggravating factors, we actually don’t know.
Claire Finkelstein:

What the Supreme Court rejected in this
instance over the course of many years was
what looks like a very top-down process.
Namely, mandatory assignment of the death
penalty based on a rigid list of aggravating
factors, and treating mitigating factors
according to that list. On the other hand, it also
rejected the other extreme, which is completely
unguided discretion, which would have been
entirely particularistic and context dependent.
In other words, the only scheme that the
Supreme Court decided is constitutional in this
area seems to be an odd and ill-defined mix of
top-down moral reasoning and bottom up.
Okay. So how should an ethical juror consider
mitigating evidence under this sort of death
penalty scheme? We have no algorithm for
that. Whether or not this captures anything of
what ordinary moral reasoning is about in this
highly artificial and legalistically bounced
circumstance, I don’t know, but are reasons
why the Supreme Court came to this. That may
ring somewhat true in our sense of the
reliability of decision making.

Claire Finkelstein:

So now back to autonomous moral reasoning
machines. The thought I have is that whether
or not computers are likely to be effective,
moral reasoners depend on the nature of moral
reasoning itself. If moral reasoning is topdown, computers have a comparative
advantage. But if moral reasoning is more
bottom-up, I think computers will find
themselves at a relative disadvantage. How do
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we decide? Well, I think that is very difficult to
say and philosophers have not decided among
themselves what moral reasoning looks like. Is
it possible that in considering the welter of
mitigating factors in our unguided thinking that
human beings in fact are much more chaotic,
and much more “seat of the pants” than
anything a computer could capture.
Now, briefly on the second question then.
Suppose despite all of these caveats that I
raised about the difficulty of understanding
moral reasoning, suppose we did manage to
capture the nature of human moral reasoning.
Would we actually want to program robots,
computers, autonomous weapon systems to
replicate that reasoning? What if human
reasoning is so context sensitive and
particularistic that, in fact, we wouldn’t want
any computer algorithm to replicate that even
if we could replicate it? Might it be that we
would rather have more consistent moral
reasoners? Moral reasoners whose processes
were more transparent to who were more
consistent, who were more reliable? Could, in
fact, computers be better, more successful
moral reasoners just the way they turned out to
be superior at chess? Well, I think that’s an
essential normative issue that we haven’t really
dealt with in this literature, and in our efforts.
It’s not as easy as many of you folks think.
Apart from the difficulties of knowing what
human moral reasoning is like, the Metaquestion here is whether or not that reflects a
value that we want to replicate and endorse.
Claire Finkelstein:

I think that before we can actually answer the
question of whether or not the inconsistency,
98

2020

Autonomous Systems & the Ethics of Conflict

Symposium Issue

hesitation, puzzlement, the agony, the
uncertainty, the vacillation, and all of those
things that characterize true moral reasoning, is
something that we want a computer to
replicate. We have to understand better what
our values are. Now, here’s just one thought I’ll
close with, which is perhaps in this domain.
What we care most about is the process. Or at
least if we care about correct moral outcomes,
we care about those outcomes in a way that
incorporates the path dependency, the messy
complicated human process by which we reach
those outcomes. That part of how we assess
the moral correctness of outcomes is by
assessing the process by which they came
about. Thank you.
Ben Jones:

Well, I would like to thank the three of you for
those insightful and provocative remarks. I had
prepared some questions but there may be
some questions or comments from the
audience. So for the time we have left, if there
are questions, please come forward.

Audience:

I want to follow up on both what you just laid
out as a spectrum as possible directions for
moral reasoning in artificial machines. I guess
the first question I have is why you think that
the bottom of what to characterize this
bottom-up is more difficult for machines? In
general, the different types of AI Algorithms.
Some of them will do better with what they
characterize as the top-down. The statistics
driven ones might be, in fact, very good at the
bottom-up, right? And the second question I
have is why do you characterize these as
potentially up positions or alternatives when it
might be in fact the case that people use both
of those?
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Claire Finkelstein:

Yeah. Well, that’s a great question, and your
first one is one that I anticipated of course.
And in this regard, I have to confess to having
entered this literature many years ago when
people were trying to build connectionist
machines, neural nets, which I understand
ended up being a spectacular failure. However,
I think we learned a lot from that.

Audience:

People who did connectionist modeling,
actually, even in the 1980s, really came up with
very instructive models and, for example, how
people acquire information, right? Or how kids
acquire information too. I want to caution you
in both directions.

Claire Finkelstein:

This is something that I would love to learn
more about. I think that one of the big
challenges that I expect for those trying to
model that kind of learning and that kind of
horizontal reasoning will be the value
judgements that one has to make in identifying
the salience of the relevant features that one
picks out as the analog. So just as we teach our
students how to identify the holding of a case
and how challenging that is, given that you
recharacterize the holding depending on the
context in which you see it. So there is nothing
that leaps out at you and says, “Hi, I’m a
morally relevant and salient factor. Pay
attention to me.” Right? So at each stage in the
process, they’re going to be valued judgments.
And, of course, that is the stuff of moral
controversy and the stuff of normative
reasoning, legal reasoning and so on. So I don’t
know how, though I’d love to learn more,
you’re going to capture that in a learning
machine.
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Audience:

So in fact, if you are asking the psychological
question right, of all people do that, there is
literature on it, and there is work on it, and I
pick them off and sell that as well. If you’re
asking the AI side of it, are people dealing with
it? I agree with you. Typically, that’s
problematic. There’s a whole literature on
value of that, right? They call it value
alignment, even though there is no value in any
of this. And it’s not clear what’s being aligned
either. That is a very problematic approach or
just entirely sophistically driven. There will be
no such reason, as you alluded to, that that
system would engage in because all it does is
determinate if it is in status to do action. So
those are very problematic.

Ben Jones:

So I will have the final question, seeing no one
at the microphone. And this is to follow up
with Oren and also related to Micah’s work. Is
this a correct characterization of your position?
So if we’re able to develop autonomous
weapon systems that minimize overall harm,
but we can’t hold anyone accountable, we
should go with this system because though we
have these problems with accountability still
fewer innocent people are getting injured and
killed on the battlefield. Or maybe even just
generally. And then sort of related to you
Micah, how does that mindset fit with your
interactions with folks in the military? How do
they approach that problem? What’s their
perspective on it?

Oren Gross:

So I’ll start. I think it’s a close approximation.
Obviously, the question of accountability and
the fact that we don’t have a human being in
the doc is disturbing. And the way that
international law has moved suddenly since
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World War II is towards greater and greater
accountability. But we have challenges in the
laws that currently stands, as to how far we go.
So issues of command responsibility, and those
issues are not going to go away. To what
extent, I mean, again, this is almost like a
balancing issue. To what extent where do you
. . . Actually, when I say balancing, it’s also,
where do you want the cost to lie? So if the
price of not having a human in the doc is that
you saved 10 lives, 20 lives, a hundred lives, 500
lives, at what point do you stop and you’re
saying it’s worth it, right?
I don’t know that we can know it yet, what the
answer is. Because again, the technology is
moving. We don’t know what the technology
is going to be, but to me at some point, if the
technology is going to be at such a level where
we are actually going to be able to save
hundreds of lives, and the cost of that will be,
that there is no human being in the doc. Even
though I understand the potential exploitation
of that, it’s a price that at least a conversation
we should have.
Micah Clark:

So with perspective to that view, I would agree
that that is the most conceivable technological
future, the easiest to achieve. I think keeping
any kind of real accountability in the systems is
very difficult. I think whether that is desirable
from the larger societal and legal perspective is
something we have to decide for ourselves. It
doesn’t fall out of the math, and I don’t have
an answer for that. It’s a trade. Now the view
of the technology and minimizing death risks.
The humans, certainly in civilians fear that is
what we’re aiming at. But in the military sphere,
it’s a double edge sword. Certainly what the
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commander wants is something that’s lethal in
an active shooting war. I’m not necessarily
trying to minimize total casualties. I’m trying to
minimize casualties to my own troops, but I
want to kill the enemy as completely and as fast
as possible.
Not necessarily because their death is my goal,
but I want to crush their will to fight, and their
ability to resist because that is my job in the
military. Not that I’m in the military, I’m not.
And that is what their role is in preserving the
freedom interests. What have you of their side
of the conflict. Now there is the issue of both
collateral and accidental death. We always want
to minimize that. Now in terms of what is the
military looking for with respect to these
things? The military wants accountability. Part
of it is because that is something that they have
as a core value within the history of military in
general, and certainly the US military on that
chain of command that you know who is
responsible and someone always is.
Micah Clark:

That is ingrained. They would like that. I don’t
know if that is possible to give them and at the
same time give them the kind of mission
effectiveness they care about. In terms of the
other aspects of the systems minimizing death
versus maximizing application of force to your
enemy. One of the principle concerns is not so
much on the raw ethnic side of it, even though
there is a lot of work on ethical reasoning, it’s
or the computational philosophy side of it, but
the predictability. If I’m from military
standpoint and willing to buy this system or
choose to use this system, I want to be able to
have
enough
predictive,
projective,
anticipatory capability that I understand that, if
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I use it in this situation, I’ve got very good
chance of achieving the effects that I intend,
and that if I don’t achieve that, I can reasonably
anticipate what the contingent situations will
be.
If it is a random dice roll, well in my work I
might not, it might kind of snake eyes, and we
don’t know anything. Then just from a risk
management perspective, how I’m balancing
my force, how I’m planning to prosecute the
mission, it’s the risk reward doesn’t make sense
there. So the military wants accountability in
the systems that they are not looking for
terminator, and they want the ability to predict
and anticipate and understand what the
mission effectiveness of these systems will be
in a contested, uncertain, under-specified kind
of situation. And those are two things that the
types of technology we use now, especially the
active learning and the deep network statistical
approaches, they are mad at that. The test and
evaluation and V and D processes that we use
for other kinds of munitions and frankly the
kinds of systems in general, even automotive
and planes, they’re almost inapplicable for
these kinds of active learning systems.
Micah Clark:

And so, as the raw technology side, we have an
idea that people want ethically constrained
systems, and we can argue about, it is because
we want them to be better ethical reasons than
us. Or it is simply that, “Hey, we need them to
operate in the gray areas.” And in the gray areas
where there is lots of data about what the right
answer is. We want them to at least match our
expectations, and what we anticipate them to
do without the necessarily saying that it is the
morally right thing. We want transparent
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systems that can produce explanations. We
want to understand when systems will fail,
before they fail and be able to understand the
failures after they’ve occurred. From the
technology standpoint, we can’t give you any
of that. We’re working on it, but we’re not
there. And that is the challenge that whether it
is on the legal side, where the law relies on
innate human abilities to ground out the
theories, or it is on the military side where we
want accountability, we want to understand if
this system will work or not in future conflicts.
Those are things we can deliver yet.
Ben Jones:

Okay. Well, thank you. Thanks to each of you.
Could we have a round of applause for our
panelists?
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